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ABSTRACT 
This paper endeavours to explore the concept of sham as the starting point. 
In order to do that, this paper cites differing judicial views to show the ambiguity of 
the concept, and shows how the principle of precedent is distorted by the way that 
the appeals process operates in the tax field, and the resulting inconsistency in 
approaching sham. This paper then seeks to ascertain how far the legal notion of 
"sham" has advanced, since Lord Justice Diplock's legal test in Snook v London 
West Riding Investments. How the common shared viewpoints and some existing 
ambiguities limit the application of sham in the tax field are illustrated next. The 
paper also examines mislabelling as an alternative to sham, to illustrate the courts' 
reluctance to find sham. 
After exammmg the concept of sham, this paper discusses sham in the 
context of the form and substance doctrine. The United States approach of 
substance over form is compared with the commonwealth narrow approach. Then 
the paper concludes by demonstrating the limited effectiveness of the concept of 
sham in the tax field. 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 14,668 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The concept of sham has been described as the "principal weapon which a court can 
use to thwart avoidance, is a function of, and not a restraint on, the power of parties 
to create legal rights and according to their intentions." 1 Interestingly though, from 
another angle, sham doctrine has been described as a doctrine developed by 
common law, which arrogate to judges an illegitimate power to refuse to give effect 
to genuine agreements.2 The sham doctrine has come to be applied in a variety of 
contexts and it forms an exception to many areas of law. However, Lockhart J in 
Richard Walter Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation3 warned of the ambiguity and 
uncertainty that surrounds the meaning of sham and its application. 
This paper endeavours to explore the concept of sham as the starting point. 
In order to do that, this paper cites differing judicial views to show the ambiguity of 
the concept, and shows how the principle of precedent is distorted by the way that 
the appeals process operates in the tax field, and the resulting inconsistency in 
approaching sham. This paper then seeks to ascertain how far the legal notion of 
"sham" has advanced, since Lord Justice Diplock's legal test in Snook v London 
West Riding Investments4. How the common shared viewpoints and some existing 
ambiguities limit the application of sham in the tax field are illustrated next. The 
paper also examines mislabelling as an alternative to sham, to illustrate the courts ' 
reluctance to find sham. 
After exammmg the concept of sham, this paper discusses sham in the 
context of the form and substance doctrine. The United States approach of 
substance over form is compared with the commonwealth narrow approach. Then 
1 Ben McFarlane and Edwin Simpson "Tackling Avoidance" in Rationalising Property, Equity and 
Trusts : Essays in Honour of Edward Burn (J Getzler ( ed), Lexis exis Butterworths, London 2003) 
135, 135. 
2 Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation , ( 1982, 49 University of Chicago 
Law Review, 859); George Cooper "The Taming of the Shrewd: Identifying and Controlling Income 
Tax Acoidance" (1985) 85 Columbia Law Review 657, as cited in Donahue, above n 140, 165 
3 (1996) 67 FCR 243; 96 ATC 4550, 4552. ("Snook ") 
4 
[ 1967] I All ER 518, 528-529. 
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the paper concludes by demonstrating the limited effectiveness of the concept of 
sham in the tax field. 
II CONCEPT OF SHAM 
A Differing Views in Understanding the Concept of Sham. 
"Sham" is defined by the Shorter Oxford Dictionary as "a trick, a hoax .... 
something that is intended to be mistaken for something else, a spurious imitation". 
However, this is far wider than the legal definition adopted in common law 
jurisdictions. This word first appeared evidently as slang in the seventeenth century 
and it has obscure origins.5 Therefore, sham is not a word of precise meaning or 
application. 6 
The disinclination among members of the judiciary to define the concept of 
sham is evident in what Somervell LJ said in O'Connor v Hume7 : 
Having had the evidence and the correspondence between the parties read to us, I see no 
ground for regarding the agreement in the present case as a "sham", whatever that may 
mean. 
Even Diplock LJ himself, whose formulation is well accepted as the sham test8, 
expressed his apparent reluctance to define sham as an independent legal concept: 
"it is, I think, necessary to consider what, if any, legal concept is involved in the use 
of this popular and pejorative word". 9 Ironically, a concept so reluctantly defined 
has fostered the belief that there is such a concept. 10 
5 Malcolm Gammie "Sham and Reality: the Taxation of Composite Transactions" [2006] 3 BTR 
294,311. 
6 Gammie, as above n 4, 311. 
7 [1954] 2 All ER 301,303. 
8 It will be demonstrated in later chapter D. 
9 
[ 1967] 2 QB 786, 802. 
'
0 Mcfarlane and Simpson, above n I, 140. 
5 
Sham is regarded as an exception to the form over substance doctrine in law 
and a judicial concept applied by courts to look beyond the form of a transaction; 
and evaluate the transaction's substance. Justice Thomas said in Peters v Davison
11
: 
Whatever one 's view of a doctrine of form over substance, it does not apply to instances 
where the transaction is a sham, that is, where the form merely conceals the fraudulent 
reality. 
However, Wind eyer J in Scott v F C of T (No 2/ 2 considered "sham" involves "the 
difficult and debatable philosophic questions of the meaning and relationship of 
reality, substance and form". 
In contrast, some judges13 have referred to "sham" as just one word among 
many others to describe a legal situation differs from its reality, where the meaning 
is of no greater, or lesser significance than the other words used to describe a 
variety of situations in which the nature of legal acts or transactions are called into 
question. It is bad company to be found in and it was described as "popular and 
pejorative" 14 and "inherently worthless" 15 Nevertheless, after Diplock LJ's well-
accepted description of "sham" in Snook, this word has been given a specific and 
particular legal character, which is evident by Turner J's observations in Paintin & 
Nottingham v Miller, Gale & Winter16: 
The word ' sham ' is well on the way to becoming a legal shibboleth; on its mere utterance it 
seems to be expected that contracts will wither like one who encounters the gaze of a 
basilisk. But by a ' sham ' is meant, in my opinion, no more and no less than an appearance 
lent by documents or other evidentiary materials, concealing the true nature of a transaction 
and making it seem something other than that what it really is. The word ' sham' has no 
applicability to transactions which are intended to take effect, and do take effect, between 
the parties thereto according to their tenor, even though those transactions may have the 
effect of fraudulently preferring one creditor to others, and notwithstanding that they are 
11 [1999] 2 NZLR 164, 193, which refers to Mills v Dowal( 
12 (1966) 40 ALJR 265. 
13 For example, Winderyer Jin Scott v Commission of Taxation (No 2) (Cth)(l 966) 40 AJR 265. 
14 Snook, above n 3, 528. 
15 Jaques v F C of T (I 924) 34 CLR 328. ("Jacques ") 
16 [1971] NZLR 164, 175. 
6 
deliberately planned with this in view. If such is their effect there are statutes and rules of 
law designed to thwart the intentions of those who entered into them; but the fact that the 
law discountenances such transactions as these does not render them ' shams ' . 
The different views of the concept of sham before Snook attributes to the 
disinclination among judicial members to define or utilize this concept. This 
potentially limits the application of sham because of the ambiguity around its 
concept. 
B Hard to Maintain Consistency in Approach 
As a question of fact, the finding of sham involves evaluating and weighing 
different factors. Before Snook was decided, in which Lord Diplock's formulation 
of sham was spelt out, there was no well accepted guided approach as to how sham 
should be found. The finding of sham depended largely upon how the judges of fact 
considered the concept of sham in each ease. Decisions before Snook displayed 
little consistency in attitudes toward the findings of sham. This inconsistency is 
amply illustrated in cases. 
In IRC v Sansom 17, Mr. Sansom had operated a small timber business which he 
had turned into a company. He owned all of the shares except one being given to his 
employee, who was an independent shareholder. This company made huge profits 
during the war and the company never declared a dividend. As the governing 
director, Mr. Sansom instructed the Secretary to make cheques payable to him. 
These were entered in the company's books as loans. There was neither interest nor 
security agreed for these loans. Mr. Sansom invested the proceeds of these loans in 
War stocks in his own name. Thereupon the Crown assessed Mr. Sansom to super 
tax, taking the sums he received by way of loan as being profits received by him 
from the company. He paid off the loans and advances he drew from the company 
before 1912. He considered winding up the company in 1916 and drew further 
loans from the company, these loans remained unpaid. In 1917 a resolution was 
17 f RC v Sansom ( 1921) 8 TC 20,("Sansom "), see Natalia Lee, "The Concept of Sham: a Fiction or 
Reality?" ( 1996) 4 7 Northern Ireland law Review 3 77, 381. 
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passed to wind up the company voluntarily. The liquidator did not call in the loans 
and advances but treat them as part of assets of the company. The Revenue assessed 
the taxpayer on the basis that the monies received by him were not loans but in fact 
distributions of the profits from the company to Sansom and therefore formed part 
of his income. This assessment came before the Commissioners, who found that the 
company was properly constituted; the company did have the power to make loans 
and it did make such loans; and that such loans did not form part of Sansom's 
income for the purpose of super tax (a higher tax rate). The assessment was 
therefore discharged. 
On the appeal, the Crown contended that the company was the taxpayer 
(Sansom) himself in reality; therefore, the profits of the company were Sansom's 
mcome. Alternatively, the Crown argued that the loans and advances were not 
genume loans but distributions, accordingly the loans and advances constituted 
income for super tax purposes. Rowlatt J made an order that the case should be 
remitted to the Commissioners to determine (a) whether the company was a sham 
and in fact carried on the business; or whether Sansom carried it on; (b) if the 
company carried on the business, whether it did so as agent for Sansom or on its 
own behalf for the benefit of the corporators. 
Two out of three Court of Appeal judges expressed their suspicion as to what 
happened, which was described as "singular" and "remarkable".
18 They thought the 
case for the Crown was very strong before the Commissioners found those to be the 
facts. However, as stated in their judgment, they did not see how they could 
possibly interfere with a finding of the Commissioners, as the findings of the 
Commissioners were conclusive and unimpeached on questions of fact. Since the 
Commissioners had found genuine loans were made to Sansom, it negated both the 
questions directed by Rowlatt J to them. It would be wrong to send the case back to 
them to answer the questions. 
18 The other judge did not really comment on the fact but form his reason upon the ground that the 
fact findings of the Commissioners negated both questions directed by Rowlatt J. 
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However, in Jacob v IRC 19, which was held four years later with similar facts to 
IRC v Sansom, the sham argument was accepted. In this case, Jacob was the 
controlling shareholder of five limited liability companies, which will be referred to 
as Scottish, Glasgows, Jackson's, Edwards, and Alexanders respectively. He had 
traded under different names before he converted his business into the limited 
liability companies. All of the companies had power to make loans with or without 
security. He drew monies from the companies in the form of loans without any 
security or any arrangement of repayment or interest. He used the proceeds of the 
loans toward financing the purchase in his own name of premises to be occupied by 
himself trading as a firm. None of these companies had declared a dividend. 
Although some of the loans made to Jacob were subsequently approved formally in 
general meeting, no previous formal authorisation was given for any of the loans. 
Alexanders was wound up under a voluntary liquidation, and Jacob was appointed 
as the liquidator. He did not take any steps to obtain repayment of the loans 
withdrawn by him. The Special Commissioners decided the loans in question were 
not made in the course of the business carried on by the companies, and they were 
not genuine loans but constituted income of Jacob for the purposes of super tax 
It is quite ironic that both the taxpayer and the Crown used Sansom to support 
their contentions. Citing Sansom as authority, the taxpayer argued that the 
companies were properly constituted entities and these companies had the power to 
make loans and in fact they did make the loans. The Crown argued that the dicta of 
the judges of the Court of Appeal in Sansom's case supported the contention that the 
sums were in fact a distribution to the appellant of the profits of the Companies and 
were assessable for super tax. On appeal, the Commissioners found that the 
taxpayer had used the monies for his own purposes and Jacob had no intention to 
repay in case of Alexanders. Therefore, the loans were not genuine and they formed 
part of Jacob's income for the purpose of super tax. The question of law for the 
Court was whether the Special Commissioners' finding was reasonable or not. The 
19 Jacob v JRC ( 1925) I OTC I, ("Jacob") . See Lee, above n 17. 
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Court answered the question in the affirmative. The sham argument was accepted 
accordingly. 
The material facts of both cases are very similar. Companies had been properly 
incorporated and had the power to make loans. Loans were made without security 
and no repayment or interest was made. The companies wound up voluntarily with 
assets distributed to taxpayers. The crucial question in both cases is whether the 
loans were genuine as the taxpayer would not be assessed super tax if the loans 
were genuinely made to him. The Court of Appeal in Sansom emphasised that that 
there was an independent shareholder in Sansom's company (Sansom owned 2,499 
shares while one share was owned by his employee). This indicated that the 
company is not in fact Sansom himself as the profits do not belong to the man who 
holds most of the shares. "That a man cannot have a genuine loan to himself out of 
his own money"20• As the Commissioner had found genuine loans were made, it 
would be pointless to send the case back to the Commissioners as it was impossible 
to find Sansom's company was in fact himself when genuine loans were found. In 
Jacob, Jacob was also not the sole shareholder of all the five companies. However, 
this factor was not considered in the same manner as in Sansom and no issue of 
whether the company was in fact Jacob himself was raised. It could be argued in 
Jacob, the fact that no formal authorisation was made for the loans as well as that 
the accountant who prepared the companies' accounts recorded the loans as 
"dividends" in some instance might support the sham argument. However, the fact 
that nothing except debits were recorded in the books for the sums drawn by 
Sansom also indicated that the formal procedures required for the loans were not 
followed in Sansom. As far as the "dividends" recorded in the accounts in Jacob, 
the accountant had no authority or warrant from either of the directors or from 
anything in these Companies' books to treat them as dividends. Obviously this 
factor cannot be relied upon to differentiate Jacob from Sansom. The Commissioner 
in Jacob found the loans were not genuine on the basis that Jacob had no intention 
to repay and took no steps to repay, together with the fact that Jacob used the sums 
20 Jacob, above n 19, 18 Lord Scrutoon. 
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as his own money. Regrettably, the Commissioner in Sansom did not reach a 
similar decision, although Sansom showed by his conduct
21 that he had no intention 
to repay the loans, and he used the sums for his own purposes
22 as well. 
The only reason that different conclusions were reached was that the fact-
finding Commissioners took very different approaches. In Sansom, although the 
required procedures for the form of loans were not followed, the Commissioners 
looked at no more than the legal form Sansom employed to avoid personal tax 
liability. While in Jacob , the Commissioners were prepared to look beyond the 
legal form of the loans and examined the transactions' substance. The fact that no 
formal resolution was made in both cases for the loans as well as no security and no 
interest for the loans, casts doubt on whether the taxpayer intended to create the 
legal rights and obligations as loans. Although the loans were made in the name of 
the companies, in reality they were distributions from the companies to the 
taxpayers. This is illustrated in the dicta of the Court of Appeal judges in Sansom, 
which was relied on by the Crown in Jacob. Sham is a question of fact, which 
involves weighing competing legal principles and considering different factors in 
different cases. Different findings could be reached even in two similar cases such 
as Jacob and Sansom. It is apparent from the comparison of these two cases that 
consistency is hard to maintain as to how to detect whether a document or 
transaction is a sham since the fact findings of the Commissioners were conclusive 
and binding. It is important then, to consider how appeals in tax cases operate in the 
United Kingdom. 
C How Appeals in Tax Cases Operate 
Whether or not a transaction is a sham must be a question of fact. In IRC v 
Garvin23, Buckley LJ spelt out this by saying: 24 
2 1 In I 916, Sansom had the idea of selling the business and the company wound up voluntarily 
eventually in September, 1917. During this period, in view of the intention of the taxpayer to 
discontinue the business, very little fresh stock was purchased and the existing stock was sold off as 
occasion arose without it being replenished. During that period, some property belonging to the 
company was also sold. The loans in issue were withdrawn during this period. 
22 Sansom bought war stocks under his own name using the sums he drew from the company. 
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"In this jurisdiction the function of determining the facts of the cases belongs exclusively to 
the Commissioners. We cannot treat as a sham any transaction which the Commissioners have 
found to have taken place and which they have not found to be a sham." 
This view was affirmed later in Ramsay v IRC5 , where Lord Wilberforce said: 
"It is for the fact-finding commissioners to find whether a document, or a transaction is 
genuine or a sham. ln this context to say that a document or transaction is a "sham" means 
that while professing to be one thing, it is in fact something different. To say that a 
document or transaction is genuine means that, in law, it is what it professes to be, and it 
does not mean anything more than that." 
The Commissioners, General or Special are the ones who are responsible for 
finding the facts. There can be no appeals on the facts. The only ground to 
challenge is reasonableness of the view of the facts that the Commissioners 
entertained.26 All further courts are bound by the Commissioners' findings as long 
as the view taken of the facts is not unreasonable. There are a number of cases 
where a member of further court had viewed the facts and thus the whole case 
entirely differently, but that member was bound by the finding of the 
Commissioners, which was the case in Sansom. Another example is Lord Fraser's 
observation in regard of the Rawling scheme in the Ramsay decision 2
7
: 
"There was apparently no evidence before the Special Commissioners that Thun actually 
possessed the sum of $543,600 which they lent to the taxpayer to set the scheme in 
motion ... and it might well have been open to the Special Commissioners to find that the loan, 
and all that followed upon it, was a sham. But they have not done so." 
Similar regrets were demonstrated in other cases both before and after the 
Snook case. In William v IRC-8, a highly artificial scheme was used to attempt to 
minimize the tax liability on the sale of some development land. Although there 
were indications during the hearing before the Commissioners that some of the 
transactions were paper shams, there was no investigation carried out in regard to 
them. No argument of sham was advanced. The finding of this case was that all the 
23 JRC v Garvin [1980] STC 295, ("Gravin"), as cited in Lee, above n 17,382. 
24 As above n I 0, 300. The decision of the Court of Appeal was affirmed by the House of Lords; see 
[1981] 1 WLR 793. 
25 [1981] 1 All ER 865 (HL). ("Ramsay"). 
26 Edwards v Nairstow & Harrison. [1956] AC 14. 
27 Ramsay, as above n 25, 3380 (HL). 
28 William v !RC(l 980) 54 TC 257, as cited in Lee, above n 17, 382. 
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transactions did take place. Browne-Wilkinson J viewed the facts and the whole 
case differently, he said: "Although I understand how this has come about, I express 
regret that the court is required to treat as genuine certain transactions which may 
well not have been genuine". 
In IRC v Gravin, which concerned another highly artificial scheme entered into 
for the purpose of avoiding tax, Templeman LJ explained "the scheme only created 
rights and liabilities in order that those rights and liabilities might be destroyed. The 
999-year leases were created and destroyed in six days" and he went on to say "it is 
now too late for the Revenue to cry 'sham"'. Buckley LJ agreed with him on this 
point by saying that:29 
"anyone who creates a series of 999-year leases in the knowledge that they are to be 
determined within a week ... . or who accepts a purchase price upon terms that much the 
greater part of it will not be payable for 200 years in the knowledge that within a fortnight 
he will receive a substantial capital sum as the price of all future installments of the delayed 
payments, seems to . . .. run a very real hazard of being held to enter into a sham transaction, 
however, no such finding was made in this case". 
The Commissioners found the facts as being, that all the transactions had taken 
place. The Court of Appeal was bound to follow. 
The above cases demonstrate the reluctance amongst the fact-finding 
Commissioners to conclude anything near to a finding of sham. Another point to 
note is that, the General Commissioners are not lawyers but ordinary members of 
the public30. If members of the judiciary find it difficult to understand the concept 
of sham31, it sounds unrealistic to expect a lay person to examine whether the 
various agreements in question have followed the correct form, and consider what 
happened thereafter to the term agreements as shams as matters of fact. 
29 Garvin, above n 23, as cited in Lee, above n 17, 382. 
30 See Hudson Contract Services Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2007] EWHC 73 
(Ch); [2007) STC 1363; Usetech Ltd v Young {Inspector of Taxes) [2004) EWHC 2248 (Ch), 76 TC 
811, [2004] STC 1671. 
3 1 For example, as I demonstrated earlier that Somervell LJ was not willing to define sham in 
0 'Connor v Hume. 
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As illustrated above, the effect of such a procedure is that the common law 
fundamental doctrine of precedent has been distorted. 32 A particular proposition 
arising from a case may only have been decided reluctantly, because the court was 
obliged to follow the Commissioners' findings. 33 Further courts cannot interfere 
with the approach taken by the Commissioners as to how and whether a sham 
should be found. 
Interestingly, it is reasonable to expect the appeals system in tax cases to be 
identical in civil cases in the same jurisdiction, for example, in the United Kingdom. 
However, that is not the case. In Snook, Court of Appeal judges evaluated different 
factors, and they were not bound by the findings of facts found by the Country court 
judge. Although the finding of sham is a question of fact, the legal approach of how 
sham should be found is a question of law. It is evidenced by Dipolock LJ's 
statement that "as regards to the contention of the plaintiff that the transaction 
between himself, Auto Finance and the defendants was a 'sham', it is, I think, 
necessary to consider, what, if any legal concept is involved in the use of this 
popular and pejorative word", that is how his famous formulation came out. 
Notwithstanding that, the Court of Appeal judges in Snook did not base their 
decisions upon the ground of reasonableness in respect of the finding of sham, but 
simply interfered with how the Country court judge entertained the facts. 
Comparing this to how the appeals system operates in tax cases, seems illogical. 
D Snook's Formulation of Sham 
It is not until the Diplock LJ's well-known dictum in Snook that a clear guided 
sham test has been well accepted and regarded as a universal set of criteria. This 
most frequently cited description of sham is: 
" .. . means acts done or documents executed by the parties to the 'sham ' which are intended 
by them to give to third parties or to the Court the appearance of creating between the 
parties legal rights and obligations different from the actual legal rights and obligations (if 
any) which the parties intend to create. One thing I think, however, is clear in legal 
principle, morality and the authorities . . .. that for acts or documents to be a ' sham' , with 
32 Lee, above n 17, 385. 
33 Lee, above n 17, 385. 
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whatever legal consequences follow from this, all the parties thereto must have a 
common intention that the acts or documents are not to create the legal rights and 
obligations which they give the appearance of creating. o unexpressed intentions of a 
'shammer' affect the rights of a party whom he deceived." [Emphasis added] 
The legal meaning of the term is isolated by Lord Justice Diplock. He did so 
by not referring to the word's ordinary meaning, but solely to the apparent and 
actual legal rights and obligations. He did not have regard to any synonyms either. 
Instead, he enunciated a clear legal test with the following elements: 
• Acts done or documents executed; 
• That appear to others to create legal rights and obligations; and 
• The parties intend that the apparent legal rights and obligations are either 
different from the actual legal rights and obligations; or, there aren't any 
actual legal rights and obligations. 
Recently, the legal test of sham was outlined by her Honour Lady Justice Arden in 
Hitch v Stone (Inspector of Taxes/4 . This approach is a conclusive guide as to how 
the legal test of sham should be applied, which strictly follows the Diplock LJ's 
formulation. It is to be taken as a matter of English law. Arden LJ stated:
35 
"An inquiry as to whether an act or document is a sham requires careful analysis of the facts 
and the following points emerge from the authorities. 
First, in the case of a document, the court is not restricted to examining the four comers of 
the document. It may examine external evidence. This will include the parties' 
explanations and circumstantial evidence, such as evidence of subsequent conduct of 
the parties. 
Second, as the passage from Snook makes clear, the test of intention is subjective. The 
parties must have intended to create different rights and obligations from those appearing 
from (say) the relevant document, and in addition they must have intended to give a false 
impression of those rights and obligations to third parties. 
Third, the fact that the act or document is uncommercial, or even artificial, does not 
mean it is a sham. A distinction is to be drawn between the situation where parties make 
an arrangement which is unfavourable to one of them, or artificial and a situation where 
they intend some other arrangement to bind them. In the former situation, they intend the 
agreement to take effect according to its tenor. In the latter situation, the agreement is not to 
bind their relationship. 
34 [2001] STC 214. 
35 Hitch v Stone, above n 34, 223. 
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Fourth, the fact that parties subsequently depart from an agreement does not 
necessarily mean that they never intended the agreement to be effective and binding. 
The proper conclusion to draw may be that they agreed to vary their agreement and that 
they have become bound by the agreement as varied (see for example Garnac Grain Co Inc 
v HMF Faure & Fairclough Ltd [ 1966] I QB 650 at 683-684 per Diplock LJ, which was 
cited by Mr Price). 
Fifth, the intention must be a common intention (see Snook) .. .. " [Emphasis added] 
The High Court of Australia took a similar approach in Equuscorp Pty Ltd v 
Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd36, where the legal meaning of sham was specifically 
considered. Being the most recent sham case held in High Court of Australia, it has 
been applied in a number of later cases as the standard Australian legal expression 
of sham. 37 In this case, the High Court of Australia states: 
'" Sham is an expression which has a well-understood legal meaning. lt refers to steps 
which take the form of a legally effective transaction but which the parties intend should 
not have the apparent, or any legal consequences."38 [Emphasis added] 
This formulation is a slimmed-down version of the Snook test. Sparser 
language is used such as the phrase "legal consequences" in instead of "legal rights 
and obligations" as well as "the form of a legally effective transaction"39. 
The definition of sham referred to by Diplock LJ in Snook has been cited with 
approval by the New Zealand Court of Appeal on a number of occasions40. It has 
been reaffirmed as the legal test in NZ in the recent Court of Appeal case of Accent 
Management Ltd v C of IR. 41 
36 [2004] HCA 55. ("Equuscorp "). 
37 Halloran v Minister Administering Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 [2006] HCA 3; NP V W. A. 
Securities v interactive Network Services and Anor [2006] YSC 284; Palgo Holdings Pty v Gowans 
[2005] HCA 28; see Paul Stacey "When are Transactions a Sham" (2006) Yol 44 Nol O Law Society 
Journal 59, 60. 
38 Equuscorp, as above n 36, [46] . 
39 See Stacey above n 37, 61 .This arguably precludes the situation that parties executed a sham 
transaction without the knowledge it is legally ineffective, which is different from the situation 
where parties genuinely enter into a transaction without knowing the transaction being legally 
ineffective. 
40 NZ! Bank Ltd v Euro-National Corp Ltd [ 1992] 3 ZLR 528; Mills v Dowdall [ 1983] NZLR 154. 
41 [2007] ZCA 230. ("Accent Management Ltd")Although Fogarty J considered the argument was 
now open in light of Lord Hoffrnann ' s approval in Macniven of Judge Learned Hand 's decision in 
Gregory v Helvering and the adoption in NZ of the Macniven decision by Privy Council in Miller v 
C of IR, the issue of whether the transaction were a sham was not the focus of the hearing before 
either the Court of Appeal or the Privy Council in Miller v C of JR. For present purposes, unless 
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Although the Snook formulation of sham is well accepted in common law 
jurisdictions, there are still ambiguity around the application of sham as the Snook 
concerned a bill of sale single contract situation, it has limitations when applied to 
other contexts, such as in the context of sham marriage, trusts and in the tax field, 
which irrevocable limits the application of sham. This will be discussed later in this 
paper. Furthermore, some shared viewpoints on sham as a result of the Snook 
formulation of sham being applied as a universal set of criteria also has the effect of 
narrowing down the application of sham. 
E Shared Viewpoints on Sham Narrow down the Application of Sham 
Firstly, a clear legal definition of sham is considered to be different from the 
ordinary meaning, as defined by a dictionary. For example, the High Court of 
Australia in Equuscorp, considered the primary Judge's approach as being wrong 
because of his departure from the "well-understood legal meaning" of sham. 
Likewise, by referring to the House of Lords decision in AG Securities Ltd v 
Vaughan 42, the High Court in England in its recent application in Kensington 
International Limited v Republic of Congo43 confirmed that "sham" does have a 
meaning in law, that meaning being any attempt to disguise the true character of the 
agreement with the aim of deceiving the court. This potentially limits the 
possibilities of a wider concept of sham (such as the concept that sham occurs when 
form does not follow the reality) than the orthodox Snook being accepted. 
Second, it is established from authorities that sham means more than artifice, 
fac;ade and charade. To illustrate this point, in Equuscorp, "The primary Judge was 
wrong to characterise them, as he did by his reference to 'artifice', 'fac;ade' and 
'charade' as shams." Furthermore, in the New Zealand Court of Appeal case Accent 
Management Ltd, the Court stated that "The aspect of the case presents two 
different problems. The first is the artificiality of the transactions and the second is 
there is a new approach adopted by a Court of Appeal or Supreme Court as ratio, the definition of 
sham in Snook remains to be the standard New Zealand legal test of sham. See discussion at CCH 
New Zealand Electronic Tax Library (Issue 10, November 2005). 
42 [1990] 1 AC417. 
43 [2005] EWHC 2684. ("Kensington") 
17 
whether they were intended to create genuine legal obligations". Accordingly, the 
artificiality of a transaction does not automatically and sufficiently establish a sham 
on the constituent document as long as each document "had the effect that it 
purported to have and none of the documents purported "to do something different 
from what the parties had agreed to do". Likewise, the complexity of a transaction 
does not give rise in itself its characterisation as a sham. When considering a gift in 
the form of redeemable preference shares rather than cash to a hospital in 
Coppleson v F C oJT44, Justice Halt observed that "the transaction became complex 
and elaborate rather than simple and straightforward does not seem to me affect its 
true nature if in legal form it is a gift and if the parties thereto intended in to be 
. operative according to its tenor". Furthermore, a round-bin of cheques does not give 
rise to sham, even when no party has funds to meet the amount of the cheques
45 or 
no real money involved.46 These shared viewpoints have a negative impact on the 
application of sham in the tax field, because many tax planning schemes aimed at 
obtaining tax advantages are complex and artificial. What is clear from these shared 
viewpoints is that even when a transaction is singular, remarkable and even 
immoral, it does not indicate a sham. This further limits the application of sham in 
the tax field. 
Thirdly, the reference to "acts" or "documents" (plural) quoted above should 
not be taken to limit the application of sham to a single-step transaction, or a single 
step within a transaction. Sham can exist in a situation where some part of a 
multiple steps transaction is a sham.47 This illustrate the point that the Snook 
44 (1981) 34 ALR 377, as cited in AH Slater "Sham and Substance" (1999) Yol 28 No4 Australian 
Law Review 197, 207. 
45 Re Barnett; Perpetual Trustee Co limited v Barnett[ 1969] 2 NSWR 721 , see Slater, above n 44, 
207. 
46 As established in R v Connolly (2004) 21 ZTC I 8,844. 
47 Faucilles Pty Ltd (Trustee/or John Karridas Family Trust No 2) v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation ( 1989) 20 A TR 1712, where the default distribution clause in a trust deed was held to be 
sham without the entire trust deed being a sham. Page 60, see Stacey, above n 37, 61 ; Case Xl 0 
(Dec o 11/2005; TRA No 98/055, 8 August 2005), where the ew Zealand Taxation Review 
Authority found that a "policy contract" was not a performance bond or a policy of insurance. In 
Hitch v Stone, it was held by English Court of Appeal that not only the single 1984 agreement (and 
the assignment and the related recitals in the 1984 deed) constituted a sham but that the 1984 deed, 
by which the I 984 agreement was completed as respects the green land, was also a sham. 
18 
formulation of sham should not be applied strictly regardless of context as it only 
concerned a single-step transaction. 
Fourth, in tax cases, the concept of sham requires more than that tax may be 
the motivation for particular transactions, which is illustrated by Megarry J's 
decision in Miles v Bull48: 
"A transaction is no sham merely because it is carried out with a particular purpose or 
object. If what is done is genuinely done, it does not remain undone merely because there 
was an ulterior purpose [i.e. motive] in doing it. ',49 
This is adopted by Tamberlin Jin the Australian case Richard Walter Pty ltd v F C 
of r5°: "Mere circumstances of suspicion do not by themselves establish a 
transaction as a sham; it must be shown that the outward and visible form does not 
coincide with the inward and substantial truth". Furthermore, in Regina v Redpath 
Industries Limited51, the Court observed that taxpayers are not required "to show a 
'business purpose' as against a ' tax purpose"' to justify a scheme because the basic 
principle remains that taxpayers are entitled to organise their affairs so as to 
minimize their liability for taxes. This is to say, even if the sole purpose of a 
scheme is to avoid tax, it does not render it a sham. In this situation, it is probably 
easier to argue tax avoidance instead of sham. This implication also limits the 
application of sham in the tax field . 
Lastly, although when a sham is challenged, the court is not so restricted in 
excluding extrinsic evidence, it does not extend the limitation of sham in the tax 
field52 as it is general for courts to accept any relevant evidence both before and 
48 
[ 1968] 2 All ER 632, 636. 
49 
[ 1969] I QB 258, 264. 
50 (1995) 31 ATR 95, 108, as cited in Slater, above n 44, 208. 
5 1 [1983] CTC 132; 83 OTC 5117, see Slater, above n 44, 207. 
52 It might be possible to argue in light of the decision of BNZ Investments Ltd v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue (also cited as ANZ National Bank Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue) [2007] 
NZCA 356, where questions of sham and tax avoidance were involved; the Commissioner may 
invite the court to look at a much wider context (including similar transactions entered into by other 
banks) than in normal circumstances. However, this argument is quite weak as what context the 
courts look at should depend on the situation of each case (for example, the artificiality of the 
transaction) but not whether sham is alleged. 
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after the transaction in tax cases. This is evident in Megary J's passage in IRC v 
Church Commissioners for England53 : "As a matter of principle, I cannot see on 
what ground it would be right on tax questions to exclude all evidence of 
negotiations between the parties or other matters extrinsic to the documents that 
create the contractual obligation." 
F The Concept of Mislabelling As an Alternative to Sham 
Mislabelling is a line of argument where a document or transaction 1s given a 
particular label by the parties, but its real nature and effect is different. It is regarded 
as a kind of quasi-halfway house between sham transactions and genuine 
transactions along with self-cancelling transactions, and transactions which have 
different effect when being interpreted in context than being read from itself. 
54 
There are many similarities between sham and mislabeling. They both require 
courts to examine the true legal substance of transactions but not by nomenclatures 
parties employed. Intentions of parties are crucial for both of them. As evidenced in 
Radaich v Smith55, which concerned a dispute as to whether a transaction was a 
licence, or a lease, McTierman J said: 
"The words ' lease', 'lessor' and ' lessee' ... are entirely excluded from the document, and 
the term 'licence', and its appropriate mutations, are sedulously applied to the rights 
purported to be created. This fact is, of course, far from conclusive in favour of the 
respondents. It is the substance of the deed that matters." [Emphasis added] 
Winderyer J was of the same view56: 
"Whether the transaction creates a lease or a licence depends upon intention, only in the 
sense that it depends upon the nature of the right which the parties intend the person 
entering upon the land shall have in relation to the land. When they have put their 
transaction in writing this intention is to be ascertained by seeing what, in accordance with 
ordinary principles of interpretation, are the rights that the instrument creates. If those rights 
53 (1974] 3 All ER 529, as cited in Slater, above n 44, 199. 
54 See J Prebble "Criminal Law, Tax Evasion, Shams, and Tax Avoidance: Part II - Criminal Law 
Consequences of Categories of Evasion and Avoidance" (1996) 2 New Zealand Journal of Taxation 
Law and Policy, 59, 63-66 
55 (1959) IOI CLR, 214; see also the comment of Rich J in F C of T v Willamson ( 1943) 67 CLR 
56 I, 565 that the existence of goodwi 11 depends on the propensities of customers, a matter "not 
affected by writing words on pieces of paper", as cited in Slater, above n 44, 200. 
56 (I 959) 101 CLR 209, 221-222, as cited in Slater, above n 44, I 98. 
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be the rights of a tenant, it does not avail either party to say that a tenancy was not intended. 
And conversely if a man be given only the rights of a licensee, it does not matter that he be 
called tenant; he is a licensee."[Emphasis added] 
In addition, the onus of proof for both concepts is normally placed on the party 
wishing to claim sham. In Northumberland Insurance Ltd (in liquidation) v 
Alexander57 the judge emphasized that a heavy onus laid upon the Official Trustee 
to prove the transaction is a sham so to displace the natural effect of the documents. 
However, this is not the case in the tax field. 
In tax cases, the onus of proof is governed by legislation58 as well as common 
law59. The procedure can be summarized as60: the taxpayer self-assesses; the 
Commissioner issues reassessment61; the taxpayer must prove the transactions; The 
Commissioner may allege sham upon some prima facie basis, and cannot simply 
allege sham on the ground that sham was not disproved; if sham is raised in 
evidence, the taxpayer must lead evidence to rebut it, but uncontradicted evidence 
of any party that the transaction was genuine will suffice to rebut the mere 
suggestion; the matter then becomes one of the balance of probabilities; if that 
balance is wholly even, the Commissioner will by virtue of the Administration Act 
succeed62 . 
Notwithstanding the similarities, mislabelling has certain characteristics that 
differentiate it from sham. Mislabelling does not necessarily involve pretence or 
fac;ade. Rather it is a misdescription or miscatergorisation which can be identified 
by assessing contractual documents objectively. Courts will enquire into the parties ' 
intention to see whether the label used was a genuine statement or reflection of the 
57 (l 984) 8 ACLR 882 at 888-889, as cited in Andrew Nicol "Outflanking Protective Legislation -
Shams and Beyond" ( 1981) 44 The Modern Law Review 21 , 28. 
58 Such as in New Zealand, section l 90(b) of the Act imposed on the appellants the burden of 
proving that the assessments were excessive. In Australia, it is governed by ss l 4ZZK and 14ZZO of 
the Taxation Administration Act. 
59 McCormack v F C of T ( 1979) 143 CLR 284 and Macmine Pty Ltd v F C of T( 1979)53 ALJR 362; 
9 ATR 638), See Slater, as above n 40, 211 . Also see Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Brown 
( 1962) ZLR 1091 and Williams Property Developments Ltd v TR (NZ) ( 1977) 3 ZTC 61 ,202. 
60 Slater, as above n 44, 211 . 
61 There is no onus placed by legislation on the Commissioner to show that the assessments were 
correctly made. Nor is there any statutory requirement that the assessments should be supported by 
evidence. 
62 Slater, as above n 44, 21 l. See also Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Brown (1962) ZLR 1091. 
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parties' intention. This is not done in the same manner as associated with sham 
cases. The courts normally look at the words of the document to find the true nature 
of the instrument. The courts can, but do not directly consider extrinsic evidence 
unless necessary, as demonstrated by Lord Cottenham: 63 
"If the provisions are clearly expressed and there is nothing to enable the Court to put upon 
them a construction different from what the words import, no doubt the words must prevail: 
but if the provisions and expressions be contradictory and if there be grounds appearing 
from the face of the instrument, affording proof of the real intention of the parties, then that 
intention will prevail against the obvious and ordinary meaning of the words. If the parties 
have themselves furnished a key to the meaning of the words used, it is not material by 
what expression they convey their intention." 
Moreover, although the onus is on the party attacking the legal substance, it is not 
so high as that upon him who would assert a sham, as pointed out by Sugarman J in 
Ex Parte Robert John Pty Ltd, re Forstars Shoes Pty Ltd64, where his Honour 
quoted Denning LJ's dictum in Facchini v Bryson65: 
"In the present cases, however, there are no special circumstances. It is a simple case where 
the employer let a man into occupation of a house in consequence of his employment at a 
weekly sum payable by him. The occupation has all the features of a service tenancy, and 
the parties cannot by the mere words of their contract tum it into something else. Their 
relationship is determined by the law and not by the label which they choose to put upon it. 
It is not necessary to go so far as to find the document a sham. It is simply a matter of 
finding the true relationship of the parties."[Emphasis added] 
Mislabelling is a plant of the same genus as sham in some extent. It gives effect 
to the parties' real intentions recorded by their legal transactions and does not 
substitute transactions with a different legal character. In this regard, mislabeling is 
consistent with sham. Both concepts involve the question of how to properly 
construct documents by which the transaction is carried out and the exercise of 
matching the parties' intentions thereafter. The watershed between them can be 
really difficult to identify, as appears in Dillion LJ's passage in Welsh Development 
Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd: 66 
"What is said is that in determining the legal catergorisation of an agreement and its legal 
consequences the court looks at the substance of the transaction and not at the labels which 
63 Lloyds v Lloyds (1837) 1 My & Cr 192. 
64 (1962) 80 WN (NSW) 408 at 4 14, as cited in Slater, above n 44, 198. 
65(1952) I TLR 1386, 1389, as cited in Slater, above n 44, 198. 
66 [1992] BCLC 148, 159. 
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the parties have chosen to put on it .... Thus the task of looking for the substance of the parties' 
agreement and disregarding the labels they have used may arise in a case where their written 
agreement is a sham intended to mask their true agreement. The task of the courts there is to 
discover by extrinsic evidence what their true agreement was and to disregards, as 
inconsistent with the true agreement, the written words of the sham agreement ... But the 
question can also arise where, without any question of sham, there is some objective criterion 
of law by which the court can test whether the agreement the parties have made does or does 
not fall into the legal category in which the parties have sought to place their agreement." 
"It is only where the genuineness of the agreement evidenced by the documents is 
challenged that it is then necessary to consider whether the substance of the 
transaction as represented by the documents is not the true substance of the 
transaction and the documents themselves are a cloak to conceal its true nature."67 
By subjecting the nomenclature, which is the legal form parties employed, to 
substance, mislabelling in fact does challenge the genuineness of the agreement in 
respect of the genuineness of the nomenclature used. 
As demonstrated above, mislabelling could be utilized as powerful as sham 
but it does not involve searching parties' intention in the same manner as sham. 
As a result, it is favoured by the courts over sham in the tax field particularly 
given the uncertainty between the capital and revenue distinction together with 
the difficulty of ascertaining parties' intentions especially when corporate bodies 
in the capacity of taxpayers are involved in disputes. 
Thus it can be argued that to some extent, mislabelling, as an alternative, 
supplants the application of sham in the tax field. The only arena where this would 
not apply is where the parties intend to create no legal rights and obligations at all. 
Otherwise, mislabelling can be as powerful as sham. In addition, mislabelling fits 
into the trend nowadays, which is that the courts endeavour to give business 
efficacy to commercial transactions.68 A court will do its best to give effect to 
parties' intentions by being satisfied that the real intention was to enter into a 
binding agreement. 69 The courts are not willingly to go behind the clear words, 
67 Re Securitibank Ltd (No 2) [ 1978] 2 NZLR 136 (CA). 
68 http: //www.rossholmes.co.nz/default.asp?sectionid=2 l 4#666 
69 Attorney-General v Barker Bros Ltd [ l 976] 2 NZLR 495; unreported decision of Thorp J in A. G. C 
v Broadlands Ltd and General Motors Acceptance Corporation (NZ) Ltd v A. G. C and Broadlands 
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which are the form of agreements; unless there are some facts that indicate 
inconsistency between the parties' activities and the agreements. Jessel MR said in 
Wallis v Smith: 70 
"I have always thought and still think that is of the utmost importance as regards contracts 
between adults - persons not under disability or at arm 's length - that the courts of law 
should maintain the performance of the contracts according to the intention of the parties; 
that they should not overrule any clearly expressed intention on the ground that the judges 
know the business of people better than the people know it themselves." 
However, contrast this with the concept of sham which invites a court to infer 
the true nature of the arrangement in an "in substance" manner, mislabelling may 
still invite the courts to discover the real substance but does not go as far as sham. 
From this angle, mislabelling appears to be a compromise or evolution of sham by 
the courts to promote business efficacy to commercial transactions by honouring 
mislabe11ed arrangements the intended legal obligations as effective rather than go 
as far as sham to knock down the whole transaction. This is evident in Denning LJ's 
speech in Commissioners of Customs & Excise v Pools Finance Ltd
71
: 
"This is no new doctrine. In life actions speak louder than words. So they do in law . .. So, 
here, these conditions cannot, under the cloak of contract, be allowed to speak that which is 
false. They cannot assert that black is white and expect the courts to believe it. The Courts do 
not willingly go behind the conditions of a contract in this way. They would far rather 
reconcile the conditions with the transaction as a whole than reject them altogether. But 
there does sometimes come a point when they must be ovenidden."[Emphasis added] 
This compromise or evolution of sham by the courts of course, further narrows 
down the application of sham. 
Finance Ltd (Unreported, High Court Auckland A256/80), see 
http: //www. rosshol mes.co. nzJdefau I t.asp?section id=2 l 4#666. 
70 (1882)21 ChD243. 
7 1 
[ 1952] 1 Al] ER 775, as cited in Slater, above n 44, 198. 
24 
G Controversial Elements of Sham and Their Effects to the Application of 
Sham 
1 Common intention and the Snook test 
According to Diplock LJ, the notion of a sham is that all parties to the 
arrangement must be parties to the sham, so a sham involving arrangements 
between two or more parties necessarily requires that all the parties to the 
arrangement have knowledge of the sham. It is quite clear from Dip lock LJ's words 
that it is the subjective intentions of the parties that are determinative. Lockhart J 
spells this out in Sharrment. Arden LJ in Bankway Properties v Pensfold-
Dunsford72 expressed the same point of view that "a test of common subjective 
intention applies" to determine whether an agreement can be seen as a sham. 
Although Diplock LJ's words appear to be of general application and his dicta 
has been adopted widely, it must be read with caution. For example, in the context 
of trust, the fundamental requirement is the settler's intention to create a trust. Since 
both rectification and setting aside a deed for mistake require only the settler's 
subjective intentions, it seems to be nonsense to require all parties particularly 
beneficiaries to be parties to the sham given that in some trusts beneficiaries can be 
indefinite and yet to be identified.73 The limitation of Snook's test in respect of 
common intention is illustrated in Midland Bank Pie v Wyatt
74. In that case, Mr 
Wyatt purported to execute a trust to share his equitable interest in his family home 
with his wife and their two children to resist the creditors' claims. He and his wife 
signed a trust deed to declare a trust over their family home. Whether this trust was 
valid or not depended on a finding as to Mr Wyatt's intention. Although the trust 
deed was prepared by a solicitor, the solicitor was not informed that the deed was 
signed by Mr Wyatt and his wife at a party. The lender who refinanced the family 
home was not informed about the creation of trust either. The judge held that Mr 
Wyatt had no intention to endow his children with the interest in the family home 
72 [200 I] I WLR 1369, 1380, as cited in Mcfarlane and Simpson, above n I, 146. 
73 For example, some charity trusts may be set up with a group of beneficiaries yet to be identified. 
74 [1994] EGCS 113. 
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and therefore the trust was held to be a sham trust. However, there is nothing from 
the evidence that Mrs Wyatt intended to deceive creditors when signing the trust 
deed. She gave the evidence that she would have signed whatever was put in front 
of her without reading it. She was fully unaware of the trust's effect. Hence the 
requirement of all parties' common intention to sham in Snook was clearly not 
satisfied. In Case S4575 , the beneficiary was neither acknowledged of nor advised 
the alleged distributions. The distributions were not included in the beneficiary's 
assets upon her death too. It was held that the conduct of the trustee indicated that 
there was no genuine intention to make a distribution and therefore, the trust was a 
sham. The requirement of all parties' common intention was not satisfied either. 
The need for all the parties' common intention is not so obvious either in the 
context of a gift. In Chase Manhattan Equities Ltd v Goodman and other/6, it is 
held that for a gift to be a sham, the donee must be a party to the sham. However, 
the donee does not have to have the same motivation as the donor. It is argued that 
it was not necessary in this case to apply the Snook formulation of sham and impose 
the requirement of mutuality.77 It is argued that the court could have looked to the 
more fundamental requirement that the donor must intend to make a gift. 78 This 
suggested approach reflected the limitation of sham in Snook sense that in the 
context of gift, what matters is the donor's lack of intent, not mutuality.79 
In Skelton v Waisoongneon 80, a New Zealander married a Thai national. The 
New Zealander believed the Thai was in love with him. However, he discovered 
after the marriage that the Thai married him for immigration purposes. The New 
Zealand applied to the Family Court that the marriage was void. He argued that the 
Thai had no intention to live with him. Judge Mather held that the marriage was a 
75 96 ATC 443, also reported as AAT case I l,I I 533 ATR 1128 (AATA). 
76 Chase Manhattan Equities Ltd v Goodman and others [1991] BCLC 897, as cited in David 
Brown bill "When is a Sham is not a Sham" ( 1993) 2 Journal of International Trust and Corporate 
Planning 13, 16. 
77 Brownbill, above n 76, 16. 
78 See, for example, Glaister-Carlisle v Glaister-Carlisle ( 1968) 1 12 SJ 215, noted in Crossley 
Vaines, Personal property, 301. See Brown bill, above n 76, 106. 
79 Brownbill, above n 76, 107. 
80 [2002] ZFLR 894. 
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sham. Judge Mather saw no difference between a sham marriage intended by both 
parties for immigration purposes and one where one party is genuine but the other 
regards it as a sham. 
This case sheds useful light on tax cases. It should not matter whether a party 
has actual knowledge or intention to carry the transaction in the manner as the other 
shammful party does. So long as one party of the transaction treats the transaction 
as a sham or tax avoidance arrangement, the transaction should be void for tax 
purposes. This is what happened in Calkin v C of IR 81 • In Calkin, a woman 
introduced the taxpayer some lucrative business deals for investments. The taxpayer 
paid various sums to this woman which he thought to be invested to properties of 
various kinds. The taxpayer received from time to time, funds said to be the 
proceeds of the investments. It was not until a cheque "representing" profit was 
dishonoured that the taxpayer discovered that all the transactions were fictitious. 
The taxpayer sought to deduct his net loss and the question before the Court of 
Appeal was whether the taxpayer was "carrying on [a] business". The Court of 
Appeal held that since a business involved real transactions and the transactions in 
this case were not genuine, the taxpayer was not entitled to the deduction he sought. 
In this case, the taxpayer intended to undertake the investments and he did 
everything he needed from his perspective. He did not have actual knowledge of 
what actually happened and therefore could not intend the transactions to be a 
sham. However, the lack of intention or mutuality in this instance did not prevent 
the Court of Appeal find the transactions were not genuine. This decision, along 
with the decision of the sham marriage case Skelton v Waisoongneon, seems 
irreconcilable with the requirements set out in the Snook's formulation that all the 
parties must have common intention to the sham. 
Arden LJ also emphsised the importance of not applying the Snook's test 
regardless of context in Hitch v Stone. That case concerned a capital gains tax 
scheme adopted in connection with the disposal of a farm was concerned. The 
Commissioners found that only part of the instrument, namely elements in the 
81 (1984) 6 ZTC 61,781 (CA). ("Calkin") 
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documentation recording the transactions between the Hitch family and a tax 
adviser, fulfilled the requirements of a sham. Arden LJ concluded there are certain 
exceptions to the Snook's requirement of all the parties' common intention to sham. 
Her Honour said, "The law does not require that in every situation every party to 
the act or document should be a party to the sham". The judge believed that the 
Snook test must be read in the context of that case. Since Hitch v Stone is concerned 
with the situation where the document implemented multiple divisible transactions, 
as opposed to a single transaction in Snook, Arden LJ viewed the situation as an 
exception to Snook's common intention requirement. Where the document reflects a 
transaction divisible into separate parts and only one certain part is alleged to be a 
sham, it is not necessary to search all the parties' intention as only the intentions of 
the parties involved in alleged sham part are relevant. This view is affirmed by the 
recent decided New Zealand case Accent Management Ltd. 
In Accent Management Ltd, two promoters introduced a remarkable artificial 
insurance schemes to various taxpayers. Under the structure of the insurance 
scheme, various insurance policies were offered to different taxpayers. The Court of 
Appeal affirmed the development in the English case Midland Bank Pie v Wyatt82 
by stating: 
"Mr White also referred to us a line of authority that indicates that a finding of sham may 
be made against a party to a purported contract who goes along with a shammer 
either not knowing or not caring whether a transaction is genuine or otherwise not 
caring what he or she is signing, see Midland Bank Pie v Wyatt [ 1997] I BCLC 242 (HC), 
Re Esteem Settlement (Abacus (CJ) Ltd as Trustee) [2003]JLR 188 (Royal Court of Jersey) 
and Hitch & Others v Ston e[2001] STC 214 (CA) ... we agree with Mr White that the 
structure of the insurance policy means that it would be possible on orthodox Snook 
principles to treat the insurance arrangements as a sham in relation to the taxpayers 
directly associated with Dr Muir and Mr Bradbury even though, as we have just held, it is 
not open to the Commissioner now to allege that the other taxpayer were implicated .... " 
[Emphasis added] 
This approach also illustrated that the requirement of Snook's test that all parties 
must have common intention to the sham is under scrutiny. As stated in Accent 
Management Ltd, it is possible to treat part of the insurance scheme, which is the 
82 
[ 1997] I BCLC 242 (HC). 
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insurance contracts between the two promoters and their associated taxpayers, to be 
a sham. This does not require a search of other unassociated taxpayers ' intention. 
Thus, it is apparent that Diplock LJ's formula in Snook should not be operated 
as a universal set of criteria for a sham. Sham is merely part of a court's general 
inquiry into the correct legal characterisation of an act.83 The starting point of such 
inquiry is to consider the factual indicators of the particular legal characterization to 
be applied.84 The sham concept comes into play when looking for the intention of a 
party or parties if the factual indictors include such intention. 85 The concept of sham 
merely reflects that only genuine manifestation of intention should be taken into 
account when considering if the necessary factual indicators are present.86 The 
finding of sham cannot be justified by any independent set of criteria. To find a 
sham, courts need to ascertain the genuine intentions of the party or parties in 
circumstances where the factual indicators show that those intentions are of 
relevance.87 If a consequence of ascertaining the intentions does not reflect such 
genuine intention then a sham exists.88 Therefore, there is no such a monolithic 
sham test capable of applying in every situation where a court is concerned with the 
intentions of a party or parties whose acts are being legally construed.89 The 
application of Snook's formulation of sham regardless of context clearly limits the 
application of sham. 
2 Abandonment 
Another ambiguity around the application of sham is concerned with abandonment. 
It is suggested the actions of the parties after the execution of the document is of 
83 Macfarlane and Simpson, above n I, 139. 
84 Macfarlane and Simpson, above n I , 139. 
85 Macfarlane and Simpson, above n I, 139. 
86 Macfarlane and Simpson, above n 1, 139. 
87 Macfarlane and Simpson, above n 1, 139. 
88 Macfarlane and Simpson, above n 1, 139. 
89 Macfarlane and Simpson, above n 1, 139. 
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high relevance where abandonment can be shown. It was explained by the Privy 
Council in Narich Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (NSW) :90 
"The first principle is that, subject to one exception, where there is a written contract between 
the parties whose relationship is in issue, a court is confined, in determining the nature of that 
relationship, to a consideration of the terms, expressed or implied, of that contract in the light 
of the circumstances surrounding the making of it; and it is not entitled to consider also the 
manner in which the parties subsequently acted in pursuance of such contract. The one 
exception to that rule is that, where the subsequent conduct of the parties can be shown to 
have amounted to an agreed addition to, or modification of, the original written contract, such 
conduct may be considered and taken into account by the court (see the AMP case91 ) ." 
In Chase Manhattan Equities Ltd v Goodman92 a helpful distinction was drawn by 
Knox J between, an inquiry into whether or not a document was a sham and any 
question with regard to the construction of the document. He indicated that the 
subsequent conducts of parties were only relevant to the former but not to the latter. 
It is clear that when sham is at stake, the court is not bound by parol evidence rule 
and it can take into account the subsequent conduct of the parties. This is highly 
relevant in situations where parties abandon the original agreement and leave it 
unaltered. Abandonment itself should not be regarded as a sham but abandoning the 
original agreement and adopting a different one subsequently without altering the 
original agreement might be challenged as a sham- again it depends on the mutual 
intention of the parties. 
However, it is a very fine line to draw between abandonment of a transaction 
and (usually informal) adoption of a different one in practice. 93 The subsequent 
conduct of the parties may be relied on to identify the true nature of the contract 
made among them. On the other hand, it is conceptually another contention to 
90 
[ 1983] 50 ALR 417, as cited in Slater, above n 44, 212 . 
9 1 Australian Mutual Provident Soc v Chaplin ( 1978) 18 ALR 385, 392-393. 
92 (1991) BCLC 897, as cited in Lee, above n 17, 391. 
93 As illustrated in Revlon Manufacturing Ltd v F C of T (1997) 34 A TR 555, the distinction is hard 
to draw. See Slater, above n 44, 212. 
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distinguish genume abandonment from sham.94 Nonetheless, smce m practical 
terms the evidence relied upon would be much the same in each case, and it is 
almost practically impossible to separate a contention of abandonment of an 
accepted contract from identifying the contractual intention.95 This situation is 
referred to in Sonenco (No 87) Pty Ltd v F C ofyP6: 
"Haphazard conduct or departures from the provisions of the documentation may, or may 
not, indicate that the documents do not truly reflect what was intended. What is crucial, for 
present purposes, is the ascertainment of the parties ' real intentions." 
In Mills v Dowdall, Richardson J explained his view in terms of abandonment:97 
"A document may be brushed aside if and to the extent that it is a sham: .... (b) where the 
document was bona fide in inception but the parties have departed from their original 
agreement while leaving the original documentation to stand unaltered". 
It appears from Richardson J's dicta that there could be a sham in the situation 
where the parties depart from the original agreement but leave it unaltered. 
Likewise, as Arden LJ indicated in Hitch v Stone, subsequent abandonment cannot 
be a determinative factor but only an indicator to sham. A distinction should be 
drawn in the following situations: 
1. The parties genuinely entered the arrangement but abandoned/departed from 
the agreement without amending it. In this situation, the parties ' intention 
are genuine and they became bound by the varied agreement although there 
is no amendment made; 
2. The parties were genuinely entered into an arrangement, but subsequently 
discovered there are certain ways to gain advantage from a third party by 
departing from the original agreement and leaving it unaltered. (For 
example, two students genuinely got married but later intended to get 
94 Spunwill Pty Ltd v BAB Pty Ltd (1994) NSWLR 290 at 304-312 supports this contention. 
However, the argument was rejected in FA! Traders Insurance Co Ltd v Savoy Plaza Pty Ltd (1993) 
2 YR 343. See Slater, above n 44, 212. 
95 Slater, as above n 44, 212. 
96 
( 1992) 38 FCR 555. 
97 [1983] NZLR 154, 159 (CA). 
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divorced, however, they found out they could get more student allowances 
by staying together as a married couple than being single. They decided to 
stay and pretend as married couple despite that they lived in separate 
bedrooms only as flat mates. The two students arguably became bound by 
the subsequent agreement, as they are in fact single and living apart). 
In my opinion, there is clearly a sham in the second but not the first situation. 
However, the practical question remains on that how a court may differentiate the 
subsequent shamming minds from the genuine intentions in the second category? 
In Accent Management Ltd, New Zealand Court of Appeal said: 
"An obligation can be genuinely entered into even though subject to legal or practical 
defeasance or entered into on the basis that it might be replaced by another amended 
obligation ... Whether these transactions are shams depends primarily on the states of 
mind of Dr Muir and Mr Bradbury as to their genuineness. Given that it is not to their 
advantage that the transactions be shams, it might be thought a little perverse to them states 
of mind which are inconsistent with their best interests." 
This affirms Arden LJ's view that although subsequent abandonment might be an 
indicator of sham, what matters in abandonment is the genuineness of the parties' 
intention.98 Entering into an arrangement on the basis to replace or amend with 
genuine intentions, which is identical to the first situation I provided earlier, is not a 
sham. In contrast, if shammful minds could be found later from evidence, then it is 
clearly a sham. However, I believe it is extremely hard in practice to ascertain the 
intentions of parties later so that a sham could be found. 
It is obvious that abandonment and sham are two very different legal concepts 
and Richardson J's dictum in Mills v Dowdall cannot be used as authority for 
holding abandonment as sham without search parties' intentions. This is 
demonstrated in Burdis v Livse/9. In that case, a party to a contract was well aware 
that a term of the contract would not be enforced in practice before entering into the 
98 This is going to be discussed in the following section. 
99 [2003] QB 36, 65, para 44. 
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contract. The Court of Appeal held that the term was not invalid because it would 
not be enforced, as they put it: "Commercial parties may, and often do, choose not 
to enforce their strict legal rights without intending to create or demonstrate some 
different state of affairs". As subsequent departures from the original agreement 
cannot solely relied upon to reflect what was in fact intended, it is not easy to 
ascertain the parties' real intentions. This results in a situation where it is fairly 
difficult to find a sham in abandonment cases, and therefore the application of sham 
in this area is very much limited. 
3 Nullity 
In Hadjiloucas v Crean 100, Mustill LJ suggested there are broadly three situations in 
which the court may take an agreement otherwise than at its forms: 
1. Where the surrounding circumstances show that the arrangement between 
the parties was never intended to create any legally enforceable obligation; 
2. The case of sham in Snook case, i.e.: where there is an agreement or series 
of agreements which are deliberately framed with the object of deceiving 
third parties as to the true nature and effect of the legal relations between the 
parties; 
3. Where the document does not precisely reflect the true agreement between 
the parties, but where the language of the document (and in particular its 
title or description) superficially indicates that it falls into one legal category 
whereas when properly analysed in the light of the surrounding 
circumstances it can be seen to fall into another. 
The first category is concerned with legal nullity and fiscal nullity while the second 
category is concerned with the Snook criteria where parties intend the substance to 
be different from its form. The third category is more mislabeling than a sham. 
There is rather a misdescription or miscatergorisation which doesn't necessarily 
100 
[ 1988] 3 All ER I 008, 1019. See Gammie, as above n 4, 311. 
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lead to an inquiry into the parties' intentions. It would likely be evident from an 
objective evaluation of contractual terms and documents. 
Nonetheless, I would include the first category as constituting sham given that 
sham includes situations where parties intend no legal rights and obligations 
although they appear to create some legal rights and obligations by the documents 
they execute. Distinctions should be drawn here between the following situations: 101 
(a) Where all parties entered the arrangement being aware that there is 
no practical possibility that the rights and obligations contracted for 
can be enforced or performed. The transaction is entered into in 
order to gain an advantage as against a third party such as the 
revenue or an Official Receiver. The performance may not be 
completely legally or physically impossible but rather it would not 
occur within the powers or intentions of the parties to procure or 
promote. 
(b) The parties entered the arrangement with genuine belief that the 
transaction will be effective. 
The first category provided by Mustill LJ is identical to situation (a) above but 
different from (b). In the words of Diplock LJ, parties in (a) never intend to create 
the rights and obligations set out by the agreement but to gain advantage from a 
third party while situation (b) is only genuinely ineffective transaction. The 
distinction spelt out by Mustill LJ had the effect of limiting the Snook definition of 
sham to a particular set of criteria, namely the second category but exclude the 
application of sham from the first category. Thus the concept of nullity has caused 
the concept of sham in this regard to be restrictive. 
III SHAM AND THE FORM AND SUBSTANCE PRINCIPLE 
Sham is one of the exceptions allowing courts to depart from the so-called form 
over substance principle. When sham is challenged, courts will look beyond the 
101 Slater, as above n 44, 204. 
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legal form of the agreement concerned and examine its substance and reality. As 
substance can be divided into legal substance and economic substance
102
, it is 
necessary to examine which substance sham doctrine can challenge. Referring back 
to Diplock LJ's dictum that sham is where parties intend to create different legal 
rights and obligations than in the agreement, the answer is quite clear that it is the 
legal substance of the transaction that the courts seek to examine. This is evident in 
the decision in Jones v Lipman 103 where it is suggested that it is the company's legal 
substance and not economic substance that the court was prepared to concentrate 
on, before holding that the companies were a sham used to conceal the true facts. 
This is affirmed by a recent decision Kensington. 
It might be open to argument that by disregarding the corporate veil, legal 
substance could not be properly ascertained given in law, a corporate body is 
treated as an independent legal entity. As case law illustrated, once a company is 
properly registered and observes all the compliance obligations imposed by statute, 
it continues to exist as a legal entity and the company itself is a reality and not a 
sham. 104 The sham exception to pierce the corporate veil is only used when the 
court does not accept a legitimately incorporated entity at face value on the basis 
that it acts as a front to mask the real operations. 
105 In this sense, the corporate body 
is merely used as a sham device or means to hide the real purpose of the controller, 
just like a sham trust. The concept of sham is not merely following what legal 
obligations were created by parties, but characterises the real legal rights and 
obligations in reality considering other parties' conduct and surrounding 
circumstance, Furthermore, as Cooke J in Kensington held, before any corporate 
veil is pierced, an element of impropriety or dishonesty is required and the 
corporate veil may only be pierced when the corporate structure is used to avoid 
102 John Prebble, "Avoidance and Other Consequences of Publishing Commissioner's interpretation 
Guideliness" (2004) 19 Australian Tax Forum 245,247. 
103 [1962] l WLR 832, see Anil Hargovan "Piercing the Corporate Veil on Sham Transactions and 
Companies" (2006) 24 Company and Securities Law Journal 436. 
104 Peale v Federal Commissioner ofTaxaion (1964) 111 CLR 443. 
105 Gilford Motor Co Ltdv Horne [1933] Ch 935; Jones v Lipman (1962] I WLR 832; Creasey v 
Breachwood Motors Ltd [1992] BBC 638; Artedomus (Aust) Pty Ltd v Del Casale [2006] NSWSC 
146, see Hargovan, above n 103,440. 
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existing (not future) obligations and liability. This affirms the view established by 
previous authorities 106 that it is legitimate to use corporate structure to avoid future 
obligations and liability. This draws a useful analogy to tax cases. If a tax planning 
scheme is purported to be used to gain future tax advantage it should be legitimate, 
whereas current existing corporate structures or schemes to obtain tax advantage 
would be a sham. However, as discussed later, instead of planning ahead and 
getting a specific designed scheme, very few taxpayers would have incentives to 
subject themselves to severe criminal evasion penalties by using a current corporate 
structure or scheme not designed for gaining tax advantages. Therefore, although 
the concept of sham can be very powerful to pierce the corporate veil, it does not 
extend its application in the tax area. 
In the tax field, the form and substance ( economic substance) issue is never 
ever an easy problem. It is envisaged that the source of the problem is that the tax 
laws can only have a limited number of terms, but these terms must be applied to an 
unlimited range of transactions. 107 The terms are analogized as the art created by 
statutes to impose their own form on the world as well as reflecting the world. 
108 
The problem with form and substance ( economic substance) is that in tax law, "life" 
imitates "art". 109 The same ends could be reached with so many ways of engaging 
in transactions, but with different tax liabilities. 
In common law jurisdictions, the court rejects economic substance and favours 
legal form. This can be seen from the classic statement of Lord Tomlin in Duke of 
Westminster v IRC 11 0: 
"Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the 
appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to 
secure this result, then , however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his 
fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an increased tax. 
This so-called doctrine of ' the substance' seems to me to be nothing more than an attempt to 
106 Such as Trevor Ivory Ltd v Anderson [ 1992] 2 NZLR 517, see Hargovan, above n I 03 , 441 . 
107 Isenbergh, above n 2, 863-866 
108 Tsenbergh, as above n 2, 863-866. 
109Isenbergh, as above n 2, 863-866. 
11 0 (1935) 19 TC 490, 520. 
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make a man pay notwithstanding that he has so ordered his affairs that the amount of tax 
sought from him is not legally claimable". 
This so called choice principle assures the legitimacy of taxpayers' 
arrangements to achieve the same economic equivalent end by using the forms 
that may gain maximum tax advantage. As demonstrated earlier in this chapter, it 
is the legal substance that courts will look at to examine whether there is a sham. 
So long as taxpayers plan their schemes and take steps according to the 
documents, even if the sole purpose of the scheme is to gain tax advantage, it 
would not be a sham although it might be subject to a tax avoidance challenge. 
This illustrates that the concept of sham is enervated and is of very limited 
application in the tax field. However, the application of the sham doctrine is very 
different in the United States. 
IV USA -AN ALTERNATIVE SUBSTANCE OVER FORM 
APPROACH 
To be considered as a sham in the United States, a so-called substance (economic 
substance) over form approach is taken. The word "sham" is so used as a word in a 
wider sense to express "pretence" or "trick". The substance of a transaction is 
favoured over the form and the form is then said to be a sham. A transaction would 
be disregarded as a sham for tax purposes if it serves no business purpose other than 
to provide tax benefits to the taxpayer (subjective test), and offers no reasonable 
possibility of a profit and thus lacks economic substance (objective test). 11 1 This is a 
far wider approach than the approaches taken in Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
The case Gregory v Helvering112 is regarded as the leading case for this 
approach. In this case, the taxpayer owned all the stock of the first corporation, 
which in tum owned some shares of the second corporation and all the stock of the 
third corporation. The first corporation transfened all the shares of the second 
corporation it owned to the third corporation. The first corporation then 
111 Karen M Cooley and Darlene Pulliam, " IRS, B&D tool up for trial" (2007) 203 :5 Journal of 
Accountancy 91(1). 
112 69 F 2d 809; (1934) affd 293 US 465 (1935). 
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immediately distributed the stock of the third corporation to the taxpayer. The 
taxpayer subsequently liquidated the third corporation and sold the shares of the 
second corporation in its possession. In this way, the transaction met the explicit 
requirements of the Revenue code for a tax-free reorgnisation. Judge Learned Hand 
concluded all the transactions were real and had their usual effect but they were not 
what the statute meant by "reorganisation" for the reason not being part of the 
conduct of the business of either or both companies. The Supreme Court held this 
transaction in substance is the same as a simple dividend distribution and the 
taxpayer should be taxed as such. They held it on the ground that the formulation 
and distribution of the third corporation had no legitimate business purposes other 
than tax avoidance. They introduced a new legitimate business purpose requirement 
into the sham doctrine to safeguard against transactions elevating form over 
substance. 
It is because of the limitation of the application of sham in commonwealth 
jurisdictions that a wider meaning of sham, modeling the sham doctrine in United 
States, is frequently argued. Some academics suggested that the wider concept of 
sham should be used instead of judicial anti-avoidance rules such as Ramsay, where 
the rules have so often been criticised for usurping the powers from Parliament. 113 
In addition, some judges like Lord Templeman even developed his own doctrine of 
pretence 114 because of the enervated sham doctrine. 
In R v Connoll/ 15, Fogarty J was of the view that a broad meaning of sham 
would be possible in New Zealand given that in Miller v CIR 116, since the Privy 
Council adopted the legal method of Judge Learned Hand in Gregory, via an 
adoption to New Zealand of their decision in MacNiven v Westmoreland 
11 3 Lee, above n 17, 389. 
114 Lord Templeman said in Antoniades v Villiers [I 990] I AC 417 "It would have been more 
accurate and less liable to give rise to misunderstandings ifl had substituted the word 'pretence' for 
the references to 'sham devices' and 'artificial transactions"'. From his speech in this case later, he 
saw pretence as a flexible doctrine, which is not so constrained by the Snook definition of sham. This 
approach enable to disregard terms in an occupancy agreement inserted to sidestep the Rent Acts . 
This is demonstrated in Antoniades v Villers. See Bright, "Beyond Sham and into Pretence" (1991) 
11 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 136. 
115 (2004) 21 NZTC 18844. 
116 (2001]3 ZLR316. 
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Investments Lti 17• In a tax case where a complicated tax planning schemes are 
concerned. Applying Judge Learned Hand's methodology, even if the transactions 
were intended to be real, and if carried out according to intent would have been real, 
a sham could be found if they were only for the purposes of striving to amount to 
what parliament intends by certain concepts such as "expenditure".
118 However, 
despite adopting Judge Learned Hand's methodology, Lord Hoffman in MacNiven 
did not use Judge Learned Hand's concept of sham.
119 Judge Learned Hand's 
methodology was endorsed only to emphasise the importance ofreading concepts in 
statutes in the sense intended by Parliament. As he said in his speech 
120
: 
"My Lord, it seems to me that what Lord Wilberforce was doing in the Ramsay case [ 1982] 
AC 300 was no more (but certainly no less) than to treat the statutory words "loss" and 
"disposal" as referring to commercial concepts to which a juristic analysis of the transaction, 
treating each step as autonomous and independent, might not be determinative. What was 
fresh and new about Ramsay was the realization that such an approach need not be confined 
to well recognized accounting concepts such as profit and loss but could be the appropriate 
construction of other taxation concepts as well." 
Fogarty J's view was rejected in a later case Accent Management Ltd, in which the 
Court of Appeal upheld the orthodox Snook principle. The application of sham 
remains restricted to the Snook formulation. 
V LIMITED APPLICATION OF SHAM IN THE TAX FIELD 
A No Point for Taxpayers to Produce A Sham 
Since sham involves dishonesty to conceal transactions from reality, sham in this 
sense can be seen to mirror the fundamental distinction between tax avoidance and 
tax evasion. Although sham can be used in a variety of contexts such as 
inappropriate nomenclature in residency occupancy agreements and employment 
law, the concept of sham is likely to only apply to the other extreme end of criminal 
117 [2003] I AC 331. 
11 8 See discussion at CCH New Zealand Electronic Tax Library (Issue I 0, ovember 2005). 
11 9 See discussion at CCH New Zealand Electronic Tax Library (Issue I 0, ovember 2005). 
120 Gregory v Helvering, above n I 12, para 35. 
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deceit. In F & C Donebus v FCT121 , which concerned an extraordinary transaction 
where a taxpayer purchased a domestic refrigerator for $100,000 and resold it for 
$100, it was said "The doctrine of sham strikes down that which was put up as a 
mere fa9ade not intended to have legal consequences but to cloak the true 
transactions. In the present case, the documents of the parties were intended to 
achieve their stated purpose". Likewise, in Gilsborne v Burton
122
, Dillon LJ 
explained when the parties genuinely intended to create complex rights and 
liabilities disclosed by the documents, the transaction is not a sham.
123 
Now it will be readily perceived that the participants in virtually every tax 
avoidance scheme will endeavour to ensure that the complex legal structures sought 
are indeed operated. 124 They would not have the slightest incentive to produce a 
sham. 125 Although the structures or transactions are highly artificial and contrived, 
proposed purely for avoiding tax, it is only when the structures and transactions are 
real and effective that they will get their desired tax treatment.
126 There is no point 
for the taxpayers to pretend to take the transactions rather than take them. As Lord 
Steyn said in IRC v McGucldan 127, "on the contrary, tax avoidance was the spur to 
executing genuine documents and entering into genuine arrangements". The 
defendants, normally advised by tax professionals, should hold the reasonable belief 
that they would obtain the desired tax advantage only if the transactions were 
genuine, and that was an excellent reason for inferring that they were genuine. This 
point is illustrated in Accent Management Ltd by the New Zealand Court of Appeal: 
"Whether these transactions are shams depends primarily on the states of mind of Dr Muir 
and Mr Bradbury as to their genuineness. Given that it is not to their advantage that the 
transactions be shams, it might be thought a little perverse to them states of mind 
which are inconsistent with their best interests." 
121 
( 1988) 81 ALR 635, see Slater, above n 44, 210. 
122 
[ 1988] All ER 759 (CA) 
123 [1988] All ER 759 (CA), 765 . 
124 Mcfarlane and Simpson, as above n l , 14 7. 
125 McFarlane and Simpson, as above n l, 14 7. 
126 Mcfarlane and Simpson, as above n I, 147. 
127 [1997]WLR 991 , IOOIG-H. 
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Accordingly, the application of sham in the tax field if fairly limited. 
There are very few New Zealand tax cases that have found a sham. 
B Sham and Anti-Avoidance Provisions 
In Commonwealth jurisdictions, it is regarded that although the line between 
sham and tax avoidance is a fine line to draw, they are conceptually distinct. Sham 
is given a particular legal meaning by Diplock LJ in Snook128• The "delicate legal 
art' of 'avoidance"' is defined as "the attempt by a party or parties to arrange their 
affairs in such a way as to avoid the application of a particular legal 
characterisation" 129• 
In many commonwealth jurisdictions such as New Zealand and Australia, 
there is an anti-avoidance rule in tax legislation, which is a kind of substance-
focused rule to reverse the form taxpayers used to avoid tax. Richardson J's dictum 
Mills v Dowdall needs to be referred to here: 
"The only exceptions to the principle that the legal consequences of a transaction tum on 
the terms of the legal arrangements actually entered into and carried out are: (i) where the 
essential genuineness of the transaction is challenged and sham is established; and (ii) 
where there is a statutory provision, such as s 99 of the Income Tax Act 1976, mandating a 
broader or different approach which applies in the circumstances of the particular case."130 
It is clear from the above passage that first of all, both sham and tax avoidance 
provisions are exceptions to the form over substance principle; second, the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal separates out the tax avoidance from the application of 
sham. Consequently, the argument for a broad meaning of sham as "substance and 
reality" is untenable, as the anti-avoidance rule would not bring into play any 
broader meaning of sham than the orthodox Snook principle. However, as both 
sham and tax avoidance provisions are used by Revenue to counter taxpayer's 
desired results through planning their transactions, the ultimate result is to draw the 
128 As discussed earlier in this paper. 
129 Mcfarlane and Simpson, above n 1, 135. 
130 [1983] NZLR 154, 159. 
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line between legitimate and illegitimate tax schemes, as Bowman J described m 
Continental Bank of Canada et al. v The Queen: 131 
"In cases of this type expressions such as sham, cloak, alias, artificiality, incomplete 
transaction, simulacrum, unreasonableness, object and spirit, substance over form, bona 
tide business purpose, step transaction, tax avoidance scheme and, no doubt, other emotive 
and, in some cases pejorative terms are bandied about with a certain abandon. Whatever 
they may add, if anything, to a rational analysis of the problem, apart from a touch of colour 
in an otherwise desiccated landscape, they do not exist in separate watertight compartments. 
They are all merely aspects of an attempt to articulate and to determine where "acceptable" 
tax planning stops and fiscal gimmickry starts". 
Notwithstanding that, in commonwealth jurisdictions, the concepts of sham 
and tax avoidance are not correlatives. 132 Nonetheless, what frequently happens is 
that counsels use the sham argument to colour the eyes of judges so that a 
conclusion of tax avoidance could be reached. 133 Sham doctrine is developed in 
common law to recharacterise the legal nature of a transaction when the 
genuineness is challenged. A sham is inherently ineffective at law. It does not 
require any legislation to strike it down. This proposition is supported by Isaacs J's 
words in Jacques v FC of T 34, "a sham transaction is inherently worthless and 
needs no enactment to nullify it." This view was also taken in Hancock v FC of r1 35 
and Newton v FC of T136• In Case U32 137, which is the case decided in TRA before 
it appealed all the way to Privy Council 138, the TRA found the non-recourse loan 
was never made, and therefore "this aspect of the transaction was a fraud on the 
investors and therefore a sham for tax purposes" 139 The TRA also commented that 
there is no need to use the anti-avoidance rule for the Commissioner to counteract 
the deductions the investors claimed as the Commissioner was entitled to assess on 
the real transactions and disregard the fraudulent transaction. In addition, the anti-
avoidance provisions apply to actual transactions not sham transactions. 
131 1994 DTC 1858, 1866-1867 (TCC). as cited in David Wentzell "Sham and Its Synonyms: a Tour 
of Landscape" ( 1995) Vo! 42 No6 Canadian Tax Journal 1583, 1583-1584. 
132 Accent Management Ltd, [59]. 
133 Accent Management Ltd is a classic example. 
134 (1924) 34 CLR 328,358. 
135 (1961) 12 ATD 312,328. 
136 (1958) 11 ATD 187, 225. 
137 (2000) 19 ZTC 9302. That case concerned the film Utu, which is the very successful and 
profitable one. 
138 Peterson v C of JR (2005) 22 NZTC 19,098. 
139 (2000) 19 NZTC 9302, 9310. 
42 
However, an opposite view was taken in Withey v C of IR 140• In that case, Mr 
Withey and Mrs Withey owned a profitable concrete cutting company. They were 
introduced to a "JG Russel template", and they sold their shares of the company for 
1 million dollars to JG's group as a tax loss. This made the profitable company 
entitled to transfer its profits to the loss group in various means to achieve tax 
benefits. Mr and Mrs Withey gave evidence that they had no knowledge about the 
tax avoidance resulting from the transaction. The only reason they entered into the 
template transaction was to make a capital gain on the sale so that Mr Withey could 
escape from a physically wearing occupation. Both of their advisors, one accountant 
and one solicitor, were struck off from the register. Baragwanath J expressed his 
sympathy to the complaints but nethertheless held the transactions as a sham. 
Clearly in this case the mutuality requirement of the Snook test was not satisfied as 
Mr and Mrs Withey's had neither knowledge nor intention of the proposed tax 
avoidance. Baragwanath J stated that the sham transactions fell within the black 
letter of the anti-avoidance provision (section 99). Since the wording of section 
99(2) indicated it focused on the arrangement rather than the objector, the question 
of the relevance of the state of mind of the objector did not matter. The controlling 
test in this case according to his honour's view was the purpose of the arrangement, 
which ought to be determined by the effects of the transaction. In regard to whether 
section 99 applied to sham transaction or not, Baragwanath J relied on the wording 
on section 99 (2) that "'Arrangement' means any contract, agreement, plan or 
understanding whether enforceable or unenforceable, including all steps and 
transactions by which it is carried into effect" ( emphasis added) and concluded that 
the operation of section 99 should not be withheld from sham transactions. Some 
doubts were cast on this aspect of Withey in Case U6141 , and there has been long 
established doubt about this kind of approach in Australia. 142 
140 (1998) 18 ZTC 13,606. 
141 (1999) 19 NZTC 9038, 9057- 9058. 
142 For example, the discussion in Jacques, above n 15 and Hancock v FC of T( 1961) 12 A TD 312. 
See Income Tax Act 2004 Commentary IT AC-BG I [Tax Avoidance] 20051102 5.126 at Brooker 
Smart Tax. 
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This view is not easily reconcilable with the statement in the current anti-
avoidance provision BG 1, according to which a tax avoidance arrangement is void 
against the Commissioner as there is nothing to be declared to be void in the case of 
a sham. 143 Neither could this view be reconciled with his Honour's earlier approach 
expressed in another JG Russell template case, Miller v C of IR; McDougall v C of 
IR 144, in which he cited the dicta oflssacs J 145 and commented: 146 
" ... I am satisfied that s 99 is not at all on the same hierarchical level as sections such as 104, 
188 and, as will appear, s 191. It is a section that deals with transactions altogether lawful in 
terms of the general law and the general provisions of the Income Tax Act but which 
nevertheless infringe its terms. Section 99 does concern reality and lawfulness, but in a sense 
is quite different from the general provisions. It begins to bite when their operation is 
complete." 
It is argued that his earlier approach is consistent with the protective nature of 
section BG 1 as this section plays a role to assure the operation of other provisions 
of the Income Tax Act in accordance with Parliament's intention that other 
provisions should apply before section BG 1. 147 As a sham is inherently worthless, 
there is no provision that it would otherwise circumvent. 148 
Another interesting point to note 1s that other than spelling out that the 
transactions related to the 1987 return were clearly a sham, Baragwanath J made no 
effort to analyse why the transactions were a sham, nor did he referred to Snook's 
test or any approach to sham. As the common intention requirement according to 
Snook's test was obviously not satisfied, it is impossible to reconcile his decision 
with the Snook's test. 
143 Income Tax Act 2004 Commentary [TAC-BG 1 [Tax Avoidance] 20051102 5.126 at Brooker 
Smart Tax. 
144 (1997) 18 ZTC 13,001. 
145 Same as I cited earlier in 129. 
146 Miller v C of !R; McDougall v C of !R , as above n 139, 13,027, see Income Tax Act 2004 
Commentary IT AC-BG 1 [Tax Avoidance] 20051 I 02 5.126 at Brooker Smart Tax. 
147 Income Tax Act 2004 Commentary !TAC-BG I [Tax Avoidance] 20051102 5.126 at Brooker 
Smart Tax. 
148 Income Tax Act 2004 Commentary !TAC-BG I [Tax Avoidance] 20051102 5.126 at Brooker 
Smart Tax 
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In a later case Erris Promotions Ltd v CIR 149, it was held that three 
transactions were found to be a sham and also tax avoidance arrangements. This 
illustrates the point that sham and tax avoidance overlap in a situation where the 
taxpayer intended the legal rights and obligations to be different from its form, to 
avoid tax, however, it does not shed any useful light as to whether all sham 
transactions for tax purposes are ultimately tax avoidance arrangements. In 
Peterson, as stated earlier in this chapter, the TRA found the non-recourse loan in 
Utu was never made and was therefore a sham. This finding was not overturned by 
further courts. Ironically, the majority of Privy Council held that it did not 
constitute tax avoidance. In addition, one important thing to mention is that 
although as long as a sham is found, the purported transactions can be disregarded, 
it does not entitle the Commissioner to reconstruct the transaction, which is, to tax 
another form with the same equivalence. In contrast, if an arrangement is held to be 
a tax avoidance arrangement, the Commissioner is conferred the power of 
reconstructing the arrangement. For example, in a situation where a taxpayer claims 
some sum to be "expenditure" so that it could be deducted against income, the end 
result to reach is to disallow the deduction. If a sham was found, then the whole 
transactions will be disregarded and the Commissioner could disregard the 
deduction. While if the arrangement were held to avoid tax, the Commissioner 
would reach the same result by reconstructing the transaction, which is to disallow 
the deduction to be claimed. However, in a situation where the non-resident 
taxpayer entered into a scheme, which was structured to appear to be an overseas 
investment but was in fact a loan, to get the dividends overseas to be free of tax 150, 
the power conferred to the Commissioner will make a difference as the 
Commissioner would not be able to tax the sum as interests of a loan if a sham 
rather than tax avoidance were found. 
Although there is ambiguity around whether the anti-avoidance prov1s1ons 
apply to a sham or not, it is clear from the above demonstration that a sham cannot 
149 [2004] 1 ZLR 811; (2003) 21 NZTC 18,330 (HC). 
150 Such as what happened in BNZI case. According to conduit regime, the dividends ofnon-
residents derived from overseas are free of tax. 
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confer the power to entitle the Commissioner to reconstruct the transactions and 
collect the highest revenue possible as section BG 1. Although in some cases sham 
might be argued to colour the judges' eyes, tax avoidance is certainly a preferable 
decision rather than a sham from the Commissioner's perspective. This unavoidably 
limits the application of sham in the tax field. 
VI CONCLUSION 
Sham has been applied in a variety of contexts, but there is considerable ambiguity 
around the concept and its application. At one end of the scale, sham is seen in a 
context of criminal deception, at the other, it is described as an inappropriate form 
used differently from its legal substance. As an exception to the form over 
substance doctrine in law, sham is a judicial concept applied by courts to look 
beyond the form of a transaction; and evaluate the transaction's true legal 
substance. However, in common law jurisdictions, although arguably it could to be 
used as the "principal weapon" to "thwart avoidance", sham is found to be 
enervated especially in tax field. The well-accepted Snook formulation is frequently 
criticised for diminishing the effectiveness of the concept of sham. A wider 
meaning of sham has been argued in front of courts. 
This paper reflects on the how the legal notion of "sham" has evolved by 
examining the ambiguity and uncertainty around the meaning of sham as well as its 
application. The United States economic substance over form approach is set out 
compared with the United Kingdom/New Zealand's formulistic and conservative 
approach. Diplock LJ's definition of sham has characterised the word "sham" in a 
way which is far narrower than the word's ordinary meaning and very limited 
particularly in the tax field. It should not be regarded as a universal set of criteria 
for sham. Sham, instead, is courts' inquiry to the act of a party or parties to see if it 
is consistent with the genuine intention. The wider meaning of sham in a sense is 
consistent with the sham doctrine but it ignores the essence of sham, which requires 
intention. Furthermore, in the tax field, as there is every incentive for taxpayers to 
take every step to get the desired tax treatment, the sham doctrine has little role to 
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play other than its application to tax evas10n. The enactment of general anti-
avoidance rules also narrows down the application of the concept of sham in the tax 
field. Although mislabelling can be seen as a compromise showing the courts' 
reluctance towards sham, it could be used to some extent as a judicial safeguard. 
The argument that supports the wider meaning of sham is not tenable and it has 
been frequently rejected by the courts. The application of sham remains restrictive 
in the tax field. 
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